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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
GENERAL CONSTRUCTION & 
DEVELOPMENT, INC. ET AL.; 
Petitioners and Appellees, 
vs. 
PETERSON PLUMBING SUPPLY; 
Respondent and Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 20080998-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
* * * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
§78A-3- 102(3)(j). See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2009). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Appellee General Construction & Development, Inc. (hereinafter GCD), 
developed and built Rockwell Condominiums in Pleasant Grove City, Utah, and is also 
the owner of several of the condominium units in question (R. 72). GCD contracted with 
Lonnie Pace of Pace Plumbing to do the plumbing work for Rockwell Condominiums 
and Pace Plumbing performed the plumbing work on each of the condominium units in 
question (R. 70). 
Unbeknownst to GDC, Pace Plumbing sub-contracted with Appellant Peterson 
Plumbing Supply to provide materials to the units (R. 70). GCD paid Pace Plumbing in 
full for all the work and materials that were provided (R. 70). GCD required Pace 
Plumbing to sign a Conditional Waiver and Release of Claims where Pace released any 
lien rights it had and warranted that all subcontractors and material men had been paid in 
full (R. 69). GCD believed that Pace Plumbing had paid all material men in full (R. 67). 
However, Pace Plumbing failed to pay Peterson Plumbing Supply for the materials they 
provided (R. 66-67). GCD was not aware that Peterson Plumbing Supply had not been 
paid or that they had even provided materials (R. 66-67). Peterson Plumbing did not 
provide materials or labor to the buildings after December 17, 2008 because the 
certificates of occupancy were issued betv/een October 11, 2007 and December 17, 2007 
(R. 4-49). 
On July 1, 2008 Peterson Plumbing Supply filed its first mechanics' lien notices 
on Building X of Rockwell Condominiums (R. 69, 19-13). Then on August 6, 2008 and 
August 21, 2008 Peterson Plumbing Supply filed the remaining mechanics' lien notices 
(R. 66-69, 4-49). Each one of these mechanics' lien notices was filed more than 180 days 
after the final completion of the original contract as established by the certificates of 
occupancy (R. 93-94, 22-320). 
Shortly after becoming aware of the first mechanics' liens that had been recorded 
on building X, GCD called the Lien Recovery Fund to inquire if they could have the 
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mechanics' liens removed because GCD had a written contract and had paid the contract 
in full (R. 151). GCD learned that they did not qualify for the Lien Recovery Fund 
because the buildings were fourplexes and sixpiexes and only single family residences or 
duplexes qualified (R. 151). See Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102. While speaking with the 
Lien Recovery Fund GCD discovered that a notice of completion could be filed with the 
State Construction Registry to reduce the time period for filing a mechanics' lien notice 
(R. 104-105, 151). On My 29, 2008 and August 8, 2008 GCD voluntarily filed notices 
of completion on all the properties so that the State Construction Registry would know 
that the buildings were finished (R. 104-105, 151). The notices of completion were filed 
after the mechanics' liens were recorded on Building X and Building N but before the 
mechanics' liens were recorded on the remaining buildings (R. 69, 291). 
Peterson Plumbing Supply filed a total of twenty-two (22) mechanics' lien notices 
against Rockwell Condominiums that are related to this appeal (R. 66-69). Notably, 
Peterson Plumbing does not dispute that it provided false information on 20 of the 22 
mechanics' lien notices regarding the date the last work or materials were provided (R. 
66-69, 4-49). The last date materials were provided, as falsely claimed by Peterson 
Plumbing, was after the date the Certificate of Occupancy had been issued on the 
property and no work or materials were provided to the condominium units after the 
Certificate of Occupancy had been issued (R. 66-69, 4-49). 
Peterson Plumbing never contacted GCD to inform them that they had not been 
paid by Pace Plumbing for the materials they provided (R. 1-2, 65-66). If fact, Peterson 
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Plumbing continued to supply materials to Pace Plumbing even thought Pace Plumbing 
failed to pay Peterson Plumbing for over six months (R. 1-2, 65-66). 
On August 13, 2008, after receiving notice of the mechanics1 liens, GCD sent 
Peterson Plumbing a written request to remove the wrongful liens because they were filed 
in a untimely manner(R. 1-2). However, Peterson Plumbing refused to remove the liens 
(R. 1-2). After the written request to remove the mechanics' liens went unheeded, GCD 
filed a Petition to Nullify the mechanics' liens on September 17, 2008 (R 1-73). 
The remaining Appellees are the owners of individual condominium units located 
in Rockwell Condominiums (R. 70-72). When these homeowners purchased their homes, 
no mechanics' liens were recorded on the property (R. 102, 318, 317). In addition, when 
this case was filed, Appellees owned their homes for at least eight months to a year (R 
102, 318, 317). Appellees paid in full for their homes and did not owe any money to 
Peterson Plumbing or Pace Plumbing (R. 317). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008) states that a mechanics' lien notice must be filed 
with 90 days of a notice of completion, if one is filed, or within 180 days of final 
completion of the original contract. The intent of a notice of completion is to shorten the 
time period for filing a mechanics' lien and not to extend that time period past the 180 
day. Peterson Plumbing asserts that their mechanics' lien notices were filed timely, even 
though they were filed more than 180 days after the completion of the original contract, 
because they contend that the notices of completion filed by GCD resurrected their lien 
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rights. Peterson Plumbing's reading of the statute would make parts of the statute 
superfluous and make the statute virtually inoperable. 
Peterson Plumbing further asserts that even if the mechanics' lien notices were 
recorded belatedly, they do not constitute a wrongful lien pursuant to Utah's Wrongful 
Lien Act because mechanics' liens are "expressly authorized" by statute. Further, 
Peterson Plumbing asserts that Peterson Plumbing supply was "entitled to a lien under 
Section 38-1-3" of Utah's Mechanics' Lien Act and therefore the lien cannot be wrongful 
by law. Utah case law is clear that if a lien is not timely filed, then the lien right perishes 
inchoate and all the rights and remedies under the mechanics lien statute are immediately 
extinguished. The failure to timely file a mechanics' lien is fatal and cannot be remedied. 
If a mechanics' lien notice is filed past the time period to file a lien, the notice of lien is 
invalid from the beginning because the lien right has already perished. If no lien rights 
exist at the time of filing the lien, the lien claimant cannot be "entitled to a lien" nor can 
the lien be filed "pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics Liens". Because Peterson 
Plumbing clearly failed to timely file their mechanics' lien notices, the mechanics' lien 
notices were wrongful pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Act. 
Ultimately, the trial court was correct in finding that Peterson Plumbing's 
mechanics' lien notices were untimely and therefore void ab initio. The trial court held 
that because Peterson Plumbing's lien rights had expired, Peterson Plumbing was not 
"entitled" to file a mechanics lien and therefore the liens were wrongful. For the reasons 
stated hereafter, the trial court's decision should be affirmed and Appellees should be 
awarded their attorneys fees pursuant to statute. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT PETERSON 
PLUMBING'S MECHANICS5 LIEN NOTICES WERE UNTIMELY 
AND THEREFORE VOID AB INITIO. 
The first issue before this Court is the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 
(2008) which states in the pertinent part: 
(1) (a) (i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits under 
this chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which 
the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and 
claim a lien within: 
(A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original 
contract if no notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; or 
(B) 90 days after the day on which a notice of completion is filed under 
Section 38-1-33. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2008) (emphasis added). The trial court correctly 
interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008) when it held that the intent of the legislature 
was that a Notice of Completion could only shorten the time period from 180 days to 90 
days to file a mechanics' lien notice and could not extend the time period past 180 days 
(R.279, 108-109). 
Peterson Plumbing asserts that the filing of a Notice of Completion, even if years 
or decades have passed since the 180 day deadline expired, would resurrect the lien rights 
and allow a lien claimant to file a mechanics' lien notice within the next 90 days after the 
Notice of Completion is filed1. See Brief of Appellant pg. 11-14. This interpretation is 
1
 The facts in this case are not in dispute but a clarification of the facts is necessary. 
Peterson Plumbing claims that it "filed a mechanics' lien notice within 90 days of the 
filing of a notice of completion" with respect to each condominium. See Brief of 
Appellant pg. 11. This is not correct. Peterson Plumbing actually filed mechanics' lien 
notices on the four units in Building N and the six units in Building X before a notice of 
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clearly erroneous and was not the intent of the legislature as evidenced by the statutory 
history of the Mechanics' Lien Statute and the Senate floor debates. Further, Peterson 
Plumbing's interpretation creates and absurd, unreasonable or inoperable result which 
would render portions of the statute superfluous. 
A. The statutory history of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 and the Senate 
floor debates show that the 2009 changes to Utah Code Ann, § 38-1-
7 was a clarification and not a substantial change in the law. 
Peterson Plumbing asserts that the language in Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008) is 
not ambiguous and that a plain reading of the statute allows for a mechanics' lien to be 
filed after the 180 day deadline if a notice of completion is filed after that same 180 day 
deadline. See Brief of Appellant pg. 11-15. This argument is mistaken. A plain reading 
of the statute, without looking to the legislative history, reveals that the statute is 
ambiguous because it can conceivably be interpreted to mean: 1) that a filing of a notice 
of completion could extend the deadline past 180 days of completion, and 2) that a filing 
of a notice of completion cannot extend the deadline past 180 days. If the statutory 
language is ambiguous, the court may look beyond the statute to legislative history and 
public policy to ascertain the statute's intent. See Utah Pub. Employees Ass'n v. State, 
2006 UT 9, t 59, 131P.3d208. 
The statutory history of the Utah Mechanics' Lien Act shows that the legislature 
did not intend for a Notice of Completion to allow an undeterminable amount of time to 
completion had been filed with the State Construction Registry and not "within 90 days 
of the filing of a notice of completion". (R. 69, 291). It is not disputed that all of the 
mechanics' lien notices were filed more than 180 days after final completion of the 
original contract. See Brief of Appellant pg. 11. 
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file a mechanics' lien notice. Utah first enacted a mechanics' lien statute while a 
Territory even before it's admission to Statehood. See Cast v. Cast, 1 Utah 112, 121 (UT 
Terr. 1873). After Utah became a State the territorial statute was re-codified in 1898 as 
Mechanics' Lien Act Chapter 1 Title 39. See Park City Meat Co. v. Comstock Silver 
Mining Co., 36 Utah 145, 103 P. 254, 258-259 (Utah 1909). The pertinent sections of 
the 1884, 1898, 1953, 2006, 2008 and 2009 versions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 are 
printed below. 
The 1884 version states in the pertinent part: 
Every original contractor, within sixty days after the completion of his contract, 
and every person, save the original contractor, claiming the benefit of this Chapter, 
must within thirty days after the completion of any building.. .file for record with 
the county recorder of the county in which such property or some part thereof is 
situated, a claim... 
Laws of the Territory of Utah, Title IV, Chapter I, Sec. 1062. 
The 1898 version states in the pertinent part: 
Every original contractor within sixty days after the completion of his contract, 
and every person save the original contractor claiming the benefit of this chapter, 
must within forty days after furnishing the last material or performing the last 
labor for any building, improvement, or structure... file for record with the county 
recorder of the county in which the property or some part thereof is situated, a 
claim in writing containing a nolice of intention to hold and claim a lien... 
Section 1386, Chapter 1, Title 39 (Rev. St. 1898) also see Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 
31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713, 715-716 (Utah 1906). 
The 1953 version states in the pertinent part: 
Every original contractor within eighty days after the completion of his contract, 
and except as hereafter provided, every person other than the original contractor 
claiming the benefit of this chapter within sixty days after furnishing the last 
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material or performing the last labor for any land, building... must file for record 
with the county recorder of the county in which the property, or some party 
thereof, is situated a claim in writing, containing a notice of intention to hold and 
claim a lien.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (1953). 
The 2006 version states in the pertinent part: 
(1) (a) (i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits under 
this chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which 
the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and 
claim a lien within 90 days after the date of final completion of the original 
contract under which the claimant claims a lien under this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2006). 
The 2008 version states in the pertinent part: 
(1) (a) (i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits under 
this chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which 
the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and 
claim a lien within: 
(A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original 
contract if no notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; or 
(B) 90 days after the day on which a notice of completion is filed under Section 
38-1-33. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2008). 
The 2009 version states in the pertinent part: 
(1) (a) (i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits under 
this chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which 
the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and 
claim a lien no later than: 
(A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original 
contract if no notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; or 
(B) 90 days after the day on which a notice of completion is filed under Section 
38-1-33 but not later than the time frame established in Subsection (l)(a)(i)(A). 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2009). 
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Every prior version of the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute has had a specific and 
easily definable time period in which to file a mechanics' lien notice. No version had a 
time frame longer than 180 days to file a mechanics lien. The 2008 version was the first 
version that included a separate time frame to file a mechanics' lien notice if a notice of 
completion was filed. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2008). 
Given this history, Peterson Plumbing's interpretation of this statute is a drastic 
departure from all prior and subsequent versions inasmuch as this is the only version, 
according to Peterson Plumbing, that has an infinite time period to file a mechanics' lien 
notice. 
Appellees' Petition to Nullify the wrongful liens was heard before the District 
Court was on October 8, 2008, just before the 2009 amendment (R. 323). The trial court 
correctly interoperated Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008) by holding that "the notice of 
completion statute is intended to allow someone to give notice to all of the suppliers and 
subcontractors and shorten the time from 180 days to 90 days to record a lien. So it's 
supposed to be issued within that 180-day period early on in order to shorten that. That's 
what the intent of that statute is, not to resurrect voided lien rights." (R. 279). That the 
trial court correctly interpreted the 2008 statute is shown by the legislature clarifying this 
statute in 2009, to make it readjust as the trial court held. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 
(2009). 
However, Peterson Plumbing asserts that the "2009 amendment to Utah Code 
Annotated § 38-1-7 is a substantive change and not a mere clarification of the law". See 
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Brief of Appellant pg. 14. In support of this assertion, Peterson Plumbing cites to Hutter 
v. Dig-It, Inc., 2009 UT 69, 219 P.3d 918. In Hutter, this Court stated: 
While it is true that an amendment to an ambiguous statute may indicate a 
legislative purpose to clarify the ambiguities in the statute rather than to change 
the law, this is not the general rule, and this view of an amendment should be 
taken only where there is a strong indication that clarification was, in fact, the 
legislative intent. 
Hutter, 2009 UT 69, f^ 16 (internal quotations omitted). 
In the Hutter case, however, this Court found that there was no specific evidence 
in that case that the legislature's intent was to clarify the statute. 2009 UT 69, ^ 16. 
Moreover, this is a general rule, subject to clear instances of legislative intent otherwise. 
See Id. 
For example, in State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah App. 1998), the Court of 
Appeals considered instances where a subsequent change to a statute was a clarification 
rather than a substantive change. In Bryant, the Court of Appeals stated: 
[T]he propriety of the trial court's interpretation is confirmed by a subsequent 
amendment to section 76-5-405(1 )(b). After the trial in this case, the Legislature 
rewrote the phrase, 'threatens the victim by use of a dangerous weapon,' to read, 
'threatens the victim with use of a dangerous weapon.' An amendment which, in 
effect, construes and clarifies a prior statute will be accepted as the legislative 
declaration of the original act. Thus, when a statute is ambiguous, amendment of 
the statute may indicate a legislative purpose to clarify the ambiguities in the 
statute rather than to change the law. Such an amendment may intimate that the 
Legislature has become aware that the earlier language could be misconstrued as 
defendants have done." 
Bryant, 965 P.2d at 546 (citations omitted and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Like Bryant, and unlike Hutter, there exists direct and specific evidence in this 
case that a clarification was intended by the 2009 amendment and not a substantive 
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change of the law. This is supported not only by statutory history of the Mechanics' Lien 
Act as shown above, but also by the Senate Floor Debate regarding House Bill 154 that 
amended Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008). Senator Jenkins stated in the floor debate, 
On line 42, 90 days after the dale of the notice completed, but no later than the, it's 
the 180 days that's on line 40. So it can be no later than the 180 days on line 40. 
So, it's just a clarification.2 
When speaking specifically about the exact phrase that was interpreted by the trial Court, 
Senator Jenkins stated that it was a clarification and not a substantive change. This is 
very strong evidence that the legislature realized that Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) 
(2008) was ambiguous and could be misconstrued. Accordingly, the legislature decided 
to clarify the 2008 statute with the new amendment. 
Taking into account the statutory history and the Senator Jenkins' statements 
regarding § 38-1-7, it is clear that the changes to the 2008 version was a clarification of 
what the legislature originally intended and not a substantive change in the law. Thus, 
the trial court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008) is supported by these 
facts and should affirmed. 
B. Peterson Plumbing's interpretation creates an absurd, 
unreasonable and inoperable result, rendering the 180 day time 
limit superfluous. 
Where an interpretation "creates an absurd, unreasonable, or inoperable result, we 
assume the legislature did not intend that result [and] endeavor to discover the underlying 
legislative intent and interpret the statute accordingly." See State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, 
2
 Senate Floor Debate, H.B. 154, 58th Leg , Gen. Sess. (February 27, 2009) (statements of 
Senator Jenkins). 
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If 8, 217 P.3d 265. "One of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is that [we] 
will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire 
context and subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject." In re Marriage of 
Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, If 23, 1 P.3d 1074. 
Under Peterson Plumbing's interpretation of the statute, a mechanics' lien notice 
could theoretically be filed years, decades or even centuries after the completion of the 
final contract and then resurrect the right to file a mechanics' lien notice for an additional 
90 days. See Brief of Appellant pg. 12. However, as shown above, the mechanics' lien 
statute has always provided a definite and determinable time period to file a mechanics' 
lien notice. However, Peterson Plumbing argues that the 2008 version does not have any 
determinable time frame in which a mechanics' lien can be filed. This interpretation 
creates an absurd, unreasonable and inoperable result and this Court should assume that 
the legislature did not intend such a result. 
The absurdity of this argument is demonstrated when you consider that there are 
numerous individuals and entities that can file a Notice of Completion with the State 
Construction Registry pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-33. For example, an owner, 
original contractor, lender, surety or a title company all have the statutory authority to file 
a Notice of Completion. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-33(1 )(a)(i). Thus, it is possible that 
any one of these individuals or entities could file a Notice of Completion long after the 
180 day time limit, thus allowing (under Peterson Plumbing's interpretation) all potential 
lien holders to resurrect their lien claims that had long since expired. 
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Hypothetically, an individual could build a home and then sell the home to another 
individual. That individual could pay in full for the home and sell it to another 
individual. Then 20 years later, or even longer, a bank, a title company or some other 
entity could file a notice of completion and all the potential lien claimants from many 
years ago, whose lien rights had long since expired, could now file a mechanics' lien 
notice on the home. Under Peterson Plumbing's interpretation, there would never be a 
determinable time frame to when a mechanics' lien right would expire. 
This result is absurd and was surely not the intent of the legislature, especially 
considering that the mechanics' lien statute has always provided a determinable and set 
time frame limiting when a mechanics' lien could be filed. The legislature surely did not 
intend to create a situation where mechanics' liens could be filed indefinitely. 
Given that statutes are to be interpreted to give meaning to all parts, and avoid 
rendering portions of the statute superfluous, Peterson Plumbing's interpretation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008) is not correct since it renders portions of the statute 
superfluous. See Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. Ctr., 2004 UT 15, ^  16, 89 P.3d 113. Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008) states that a mechanics' lien notice must be filed within "180 
days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original contract if no notice 
of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33". Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008) 
(emphasis added). If Peterson Plumbing's interpretation were correct, there would be no 
reason to have the 180 day limitation language in the Statute. The legislature could have 
simple said that a mechanics' lien notice must be filed within 90 days after the filing of 
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the notice of completion. The 180 day language is rendered superfluous under Peterson 
Plumbing's interpretation. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008) 
by holding that the filing of a notice of completion could only shorten the time frame to 
file a mechanics' lien from 180 days to 90 days, but could not lengthen the time past the 
180 days. Therefore, Peterson Plumbing's mechanics' lien notices were filed untimely 
and were void ab initio. 
IL THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PETERSON 
PLUMBING'S MECHANICS5 LIENS WERE WRONGFUL LIENS 
Peterson Plumbing contends that their mechanics' lien notices were expressly 
authorized by statute and that they were entitled to a lien under Utah Code Ann § 38-1-3. 
See Brief of Appellant pg. 15-27. Peterson Plumbing's argument is mistaken and has 
failed to consider all portions of the relevant statutes. The trial court correctly ruled that 
Peterson Plumbing's mechanics' lien notices were not expressly authorized by statute and 
were therefore wrongful (R. 280-278). 
A, Peterson Plumbing's mechanics' lien notices were not expressly 
authorized by statute. 
Peterson Plumbing quotes extensively from the Hutter v. Dig-It, Inc., 2009 UT 69, 
to support its assertion that its mechanics' lien notices were "expressly authorized 
by.. .statute," and therefore not wrongful liens. See Brief of Appellant pg. 16-19. The 
Hutter case did hold that Dig-It's mechanics' lien was "expressly authorized by statute" 
in that case and therefore not a wrongful lien. Hutter, 2009 UT 69, \ 52. However, this 
does not mean that any document created or filed purporting to be a mechanics' lien is 
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expressly authorized by statute. The Hutter case is distinguishable because it did not 
involve the vital element of timely filing a mechanics' lien notice. 
The Court of Appeals addressed this specific issue when it stated, "The wrongful 
lien statute declares: This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under 
Section 38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens. Thus, 
the statute is not so broad as to exempt any filing that purports to arise under the 
mechanics1 lien statute. Instead, section 38-9-2(3) only excludes persons 'entitled' to a 
mechanics' lien." Foothill Park, LCv. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App. 113, % 19, 182 P.3d 
924 (internal quotations and citations omitted; emphasis added). 
Furthermore, the Utah Wrongful Lien Act also provides that a wrongful lien is 
determined at the time it is recorded or filed. For example, Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6) 
(2008) provides: 
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien, notice of 
interest, or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the 
time it is recorded or filed is not: (a) expressly authorized by this chapter or 
another state or federal statute; (b) authorized by or contained in an order or 
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in the state; or (c) signed by or 
authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6) (2008) (emphasis added). 
In Foothill, the Court of Appeals further stated that whether a person is "entitled to 
a lien" is determined at the time the notice is filed. Foothill Park, LC, 2008 UT App. 
113, If 20. Peterson Plumbing concedes that the Foothill case holds that an untimely 
mechanics' lien is in fact a wrongful lien pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Statute. See 
Brief of Appellant pg. 20. 
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This Court recently interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6) (2008) and stated: 
This legislative history makes clear that the legislature intended that the definition 
of "wrongful lien" should encompass only common law liens. Therefore, we 
conclude that the phrase "not expressly authorized by ... statute" in the Wrongful 
Lien Act does not include statutorily created liens that ultimately prove 
unenforceable. Because Dig-It filed a mechanic's lien, which is expressly 
authorized by statute, the lien, though unenforceable for the reasons stated above, 
is not wrongful... 
Hutter, 2009 UT 69, % 52 (emphasis added). Upon first glance, the Foothill and Hutter 
cases seem to be incompatible. However, the cases are distinguishable. 
In Foothill, the Court dealt with a timeliness issue. Foothill Park, LC, 2008 UT 
App. 113, ^  6-11. "Compliance with the statute is required before a party is entitled to 
the benefits created by the statute. If a party does not comply with the statutory deadline 
for enforcement, the lien right perishes inchoate and all of a party's rights and remedies 
under the mechanics' lien statute are extinguished." Foothill Park, LCv. Judston, Inc., 
2008 UT App. 113, |^6 (punctuation and citations omitted). 
In Hutter, however, this Court dealt with a mechanics' lien that was determined to 
be invalid because no preliminary notice was filed by the lien claimant; not a timelines of 
the filing of the mechanics' lien notice. Hutter, 2009 UT 69, f 2. This Court stated in 
Hutter that, "the Wrongful Lien Act does not include statutorily created liens that 
ultimately prove unenforceable." Id. 1{52 (emphasis added). Therefore, pursuant to 
Hutter, an untimely mechanics' lien is still a wrongful lien because there is no statutory 
right to file a belated mechanics' lien. 
The importance of the timeliness of filing a lien is demonstrated in two Utah Court 
of Appeals cases regarding the filing of a lis pendens. A lis pendens is a statutory created 
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lien that allows a party to record a lien on real property on an "action affecting the title to, 
or the right to possession of, real property." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1303. A lis 
pendens is a statutory lien and not a common law lien. 
Even though a lis pendens is a statutory lien and specifically authorized in the 
Wrongful Lien Statute at Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-2(2) (2008), the Utah Court of Appeals 
has held that it still can be a wrongful lien pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Statute if it is 
not timely filed. In DougJessop Const, Inc. v. Anderton, 2008 UT APP 348, t 19, 195 
P.3d 493, the Court of Appeals held that a lis pendens was a wrongful lien because it 
preceded the filing of the counterclaim and was therefore not timely filed. 
Also, in Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243, ffif 46-50, 166 P.3d 639, the 
Court of Appeals again considered if an invalid lis pendens could be a wrongful lien. In 
Farnsworth the Court of Appeals stated that "Section 38-9-1 requires a court to 
determine whether a lien is wrongful by evaluating it 'at the time it is recorded or filed'." 
Id. \ 50. In Farnsworth, the lien was deemed to not be a wrongful lien because the lis 
pendens was filed timely and therefore expressly authorized by the statute. 
These two lis pendens cases perfectly demonstrate the importance of a lien being 
timely filed. If a lien is not timely filed it can be a wrongful lien under the Wrongful 
Lien Statute. In the current case Peterson Plumbing did not timely file its notice of 
mechanics' lien (R. 93-94, 320-22). The lien was filed more than 180 days after 
completion of the final contract (R. 93-94, 320-22). Therefore, at the time of the filing of 
the lien, Peterson Plumbing was not "expressly authorized by .. .statute" to file the 
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mechanics lien notices. Accordingly, once the 180 day passed, Peterson Plumbing had 
no statutory right to file a lien, period. Thus, its lien notices were wrongful. 
B. Peterson Plumbing was not entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-2(3) (2008) states, "This chapter does not apply to a 
person entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, 
Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens." (emphasis added). Peterson Plumbing asserts that the 
Court of Appeals in Foothill misinterpreted the above statute. See Brief of Appellant pg. 
20. Peterson Plumbing claims that the Court of Appeals inappropriately "isolated the 
phrase 'entitled to a lien' from the phrase 'entitled to a lien under section 38-1-3". See 
Brief of Appellant pg. 20. Peterson Plumbing then contends, "As a result, the Court of 
Appeals defined entitlement to a mechanics' lien generally in the overall context of lien 
validity under the entire Mechanics' Lien Act, including the filing provisions set forth in 
Utah Code § 38-1-7 and 38-1-11, rather than by reference to 'section 38-1-3'." See Brief 
of Appellant pg. 20-21. Peterson Plumbing then claims that the Court of Appeals 
interpretation renders the phrase "under section 38-1-3" superfluous and inoperative. 
This argument is erroneous. The Court of Appeals decision in Foothill does not 
render the phrase "under section 38-1-3" superfluous and inoperative. In fact, it is 
Peterson Plumbing's own interpretation that renders the remaining portion of Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-9-2(3) superfluous. 
Peterson Plumbing completely ignores the remaining portion of Utah Code Ann. § 
38-9-2(3) that states, "who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1 Mechanics' Liens." 
The statute has two prongs, the first of which requires the lien claimant to be "entitled to 
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a lien under section 38-1-3" and the second prong requires the lien claimant to file a lien 
"pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1 Mechanics' Liens." Peterson pluming does not consider 
the second prong of this statute. A lien must be timely filed to be filed "pursuant to Title 
38, Chapter 1 Mechanics' Liens." See Foothill Park, LC, 2008 UT App. 113, ffi[ 6-11. 
Since Peterson Plumbing's mechanics' lien notices were not filed pursuant to Title 38, 
Chapter 1 Mechanics' Liens, they are not exempt from the wrongful lien statute. 
Peterson Plumbing further asserts that the proper interpretation "leads to a three-
prong test for determining whether a lien claimant is 'entitled' to a mechanics' lien. (1) 
the lien claimant must be identifiable as a contractor, subcontractor, licensed architect, or 
as belonging to one of the other groups identified in Utah Code § 38-1-3; (2) the lien 
claimant must have 'rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials 
or equipment' upon the property; and (3) the work performed must have been performed 
'at the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, 
contractor, or otherwise." See Brief of Appellant pg. 22. Peterson Plumbing states that if 
these three prongs are met then the lien claimant is entitled to a lien, regardless if the lien 
is timely or not. 
Appellees agree with the Peterson Plumbing's three-prong test but the test should 
include an additional fourth prong that a mechanics' lien notice must be timely filed. 
This interpretation would be consistent with the Foothill case, the Anderton case, with 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-2(3) (2008), and with Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 (2008). This 
additional prong would almost certainly be the easiest and quickest to determine of all the 
prongs. If a notice of completion was filed with the State Construction Registry then the 
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mechanics' lien would have to be filed within 90 calendar days of the notice of 
completion but no more than 180 days of completion of the original contract. If no notice 
of completion was filed with the State Construction Registry then the lien claimant would 
have 180 calendar days from final completion of the original contract. Final completion 
of the original contract will almost always be determined by the certificate of occupancy 
filed on the property. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7. To determine if the fourth-prong is 
met would require a simple procedure of counting the calendar days after the completion 
of the original contract or after the notice of completion was filed. The other prongs 
would certainly not be so easy to determine. If there was a dispute on whether or not a 
lien claimant actually worked on the property or if he did so at the instance of the owner 
it would most likely require a fact finding hearing with testimony and numerous 
witnesses. The easiest prong to determine would be the timeliness of the filing. 
Lastly, if Peterson Plumbing's three-prong test was accepted without the fourth-
prong, innocent homeowners could face severe consequences. Under Peterson 
Plumbing's interpretation, a contractor who did work on the property at the instance of 
the owner could theoretically file a mechanics' lien notice at any time without any danger 
of it being a wrongful lien, even if the contractor filed the lien for purely malicious 
purposes. A contractor could wait 10 years or more and file a mechanics' lien out of 
spite right before a home owner was going to sell the home or refinance. The home 
owner would have no speedy remedy to remove the mechanics' lien from the property 
without the option of the Wrongful Lien Statute. The lien claimant has 180 days to file 
suit to foreclose on the mechanics' lien. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11. Without the 
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Wrongful Lien Remedies, the home owner would be forced to wait the 180 days to see if 
the lien claimant files suit. During that 180 day period the sale of the home would most 
likely fail or the homeowner could fail to refinance. The homeowner could possibly sue 
the contractor for damages but the conclusion of that would take many months and the 
harm caused by the wrongful lien would have already taken place. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons stated above, Appellees respectfully request this Court to affirm 
the trial court's holding that Utah Code Ann. § 38-7-1 does not indefinitely extend the 
right to file a mechanics' lien notice. In addition, Appellees respectfully request this 
Court to award attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4(2), which 
provides for attorney's fees and costs if a wrongful lien is not removed, and Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-18, which provides that a party who successfully defends against a 
mechanics' lien is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. Appellees further ask that this 
matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court for a determination of damages pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S d a y of April, 2010. 
Paul D. Dodd 
Counsel for Petitioners/Appellees 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 (2008). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 (2008). 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing or 
renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or improvement 
of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner and licensed 
architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, 
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have 
rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the 
property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor, or 
furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor 
performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at 
the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, 
contractor, or otherwise except as the lien is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the 
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to 
such interest as the owner may have in the property. 
ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (2007). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (2007). 
(l)(a)(i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits under this 
chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property, 
or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien within 
90 days after the date of final completion of the original contract under which the 
claimant claims a lien under the chapter, (ii) For purposes of this Subsection (1), final 
completion of the original contract means: (A) if as a result of work performed under the 
original contract a permanent certificate of occupancy is required for the work, the date 
of issuance of a permanent certificate of occupancy by the local government entity 
having jurisdiction over the construction project; (B) if no certificate of occupancy is 
required by the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project, 
but as a result of the work performed under the original contract an inspection is required 
as per state-adopted building codes for the work, the date of the final inspection for the 
work by the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project; or 
(C) if with regard to work performed under the original contract no certificate of 
occupancy and no final inspection are required as per state-adopted building codes by the 
local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project, the date on 
which there remains no substantial work to be completed to finish the work on the 
original contract. 
(b) Notwithstanding Section 38-1-2, where a subcontractor performs substantial 
work after the applicable dates established by Subsections (l)(a)(ii)(A) and (B), 
that subcontractor's subcontract shall be considered an original contract for the 
sole purpose of determining: (i) the subcontractor's time frame to file a notice of 
intent to hold and claim a lien under this Subsection (1); and (ii) the original 
contractor's time frame to file a notice of intent to hold and claim a lien under 
Subsection (1) for that subcontractor's work. 
(c) For purposes of this section, the term "substantial work'5 does not include: (i) 
repair work; or (ii) warranty work. 
(d) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(a)(ii), final completion of the original contract 
does not occur if work remains to be completed for which the owner is holding 
payment to ensure completion of that work. 
(2)(a) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement setting forth: (i) the 
name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner; (ii) 
the name of the person: (A) by whom the lien claimant was employed; or (B) to whom 
the lien claimant furnished the equipment or material; (iii) the time when: (A) the first 
and last labor or service was performed; or (B) the first and last equipment or material 
was furnished; (iv) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; (v) the 
name, current address, and current phone number of the lien claimant; (vi) the amount of 
the lien claim; (vii) the signature of the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized 
agent; (viii) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, 
Recording of Documents; and (ix) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as 
defined in Section 38-11-102, a statement describing what steps an owner, as defined in 
Section 38-11-102, may take to require a lien claimant to remove the lien in accordance 
with Section 38-11-107. 
(b) Substantial compliance with the requirements of this chapter is sufficient to 
hold and claim a lien. 
(3)(a) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail 
by certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to: (i) the reputed owner of the real property; 
or (ii) the record owner of the real property. 
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the lien 
claimant, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of the 
record owner, using the names and addresses appearing on the last completed real 
property assessment rolls of the county where the affected property is located. 
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record 
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees 
against the reputed owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
(4) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make rules governing 
the form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(a)(ix). 
ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (2008). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (2008). 
(l)(a)(i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits under this 
chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property, 
or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien within: 
(A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original contract if no 
notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; or (B) 90 days after the day on which 
a notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33. (ii) For purposes of this Subsection 
(1), final completion of the original contract, and for purposes of Section 38-1-33, final 
completion of the project, means: (A) if as a result of work performed under the original 
contract a permanent certificate of occupancy is required for the work, the date of 
issuance of a permanent certificate of occupancy by the local government entity having 
jurisdiction over the construction project; (B) if no certificate of occupancy is required by 
the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project, but as a 
result of the work performed under the original contract an inspection is required as per 
state-adopted building codes for the work, the date of the final inspection for the work by 
the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project; or (C) if 
with regard to work performed under the original contract no certificate of occupancy and 
no final inspection are required as per state-adopted building codes by the local 
government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project, the date on which 
there remains no substantial work to be completed to finish the work on the original 
contract. 
(b) Notwithstanding Section 38-1-2, where a subcontractor performs substantial 
work after the applicable dates established by Subsections (l)(a)(ii)(A) and (B), 
that subcontractor's subcontract shall be considered an original contract for the 
sole purpose of determining: (i) the subcontractor's time frame to file a notice of 
intent to hold and claim a lien under this Subsection (1); and (ii) the original 
contractor's time frame to file a nolice of intent to hold and claim a lien under this 
Subsection (1) for that subcontractor's work. 
(c) For purposes of this chapter, the term "substantial work" does not include: (i) 
repair work; or (ii) warranty work. 
(d) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(a)(ii), final completion of the original contract 
does not occur if work remains to be completed for which the owner is holding 
payment to ensure completion of that work. 
(2)(a) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement setting forth: (i) the 
name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner; (ii) 
the name of the person: (A) by whom the lien claimant was employed; or (B) to whom 
the lien claimant furnished the equipment or material; (iii) the time when: (A) the first 
and last labor or service was performed; or (B) the first and last equipment or material 
was furnished; (iv) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; (v) the 
name, current address, and current phone number of the lien claimant; (vi) the amount of 
the lien claim; (vii) the signature of the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized 
agent; (viii) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, 
Recording of Documents; and (ix) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as 
defined in Section 38-11-102, a statement describing what steps an owner, as defined in 
Section 38-11-102, may take to require a lien claimant to remove the lien in accordance 
with Section 38-11-107. 
(b) Substantial compliance with the requirements of this chapter is sufficient to 
hold and claim a lien. 
(3)(a) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail 
by certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to: (i) the reputed owner of the real property; 
or (ii) the record owner of the real property. 
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the lien 
claimant, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of the 
record owner, using the names and addresses appearing on the last completed real 
property assessment rolls of the county where the affected property is located. 
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record 
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees 
against the reputed owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
(4) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make rules governing 
the form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(a)(ix). 
ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (2009). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (2009). 
(l)(a)(i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits under 
this chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the 
property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien 
no later than: (A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original 
contract if no notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; or (B) 90 days after the 
day on which a notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33 but not later than the 
time frame established in Subsection (l)(a)(i)(A). (ii) For purposes of this Subsection (1), 
final completion of the original contract, and for purposes of Section 38-1-33, final 
completion of the project, means: (A) if as a result of work performed under the original 
contract a permanent certificate of occupancy is required for the work, the date of 
issuance of a permanent certificate of occupancy by the local government entity having 
jurisdiction over the construction project; (B) if no certificate of occupancy is required by 
the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project, but as a 
result of the work performed under the original contract an inspection is required as per 
state-adopted building codes for the work, the date of the final inspection for the work by 
the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project; (C) if with 
regard to work performed under the original contract no certificate of occupancy and no 
final inspection are required as per state-adopted building codes by the local government 
entity having jurisdiction over the construction project, the date on which there remains 
no substantial work to be completed to finish the work on the original contract; or (D) if 
as a result of termination of the original contract prior to the completion of the work 
defined by the original contract, the compliance agency does not issue a certificate of 
occupancy or final inspection, the last date on which substantial work was performed 
under the original contract. 
(b) Notwithstanding Section 38-1-2, where a subcontractor performs substantial 
work after the applicable dates established by Subsections (l)(a)(ii)(A) and (B), 
that subcontractor's subcontract shall be considered an original contract for the 
sole purpose of determining: (i) the subcontractor's time frame to file a notice of 
intent to hold and claim a lien under this Subsection (1); and (ii) the original 
contractor's time frame to file a notice of intent to hold and claim a lien under this 
Subsection (1) for that subcontractor's work. 
(c) For purposes of this chapter, the term "substantial work" does not include: (i) 
repair work; or (ii) warranty work. 
(d) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(a)(ii)(C), final completion of the original 
contract does not occur if work remains to be completed for which the owner is 
holding payment to ensure completion of that work 
(2)(a) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement setting forth: (i) the 
name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner; (ii) 
the name of the person:(A) by whom the lien claimant was employed; or (B) to whom the 
lien claimant furnished the equipment or material; (iii) the time when: (A) the first and 
last labor or service was performed; or (B) the first and last equipment or material was 
furnished; (iv) a description of the property, sufficient for identification (v) the name, 
current address, and current phone number of the lien claimant; (vi) the amount of the 
lien claim; (vii) the signature of the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent; 
(viii) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording 
of Documents; and (ix) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as defined in 
Section 38-11-102, a statement describing what steps an owner, as defined in Section 38-
11-102, may take to require a lien claimant to remove the lien in accordance with Section 
38-11-107. 
(b) Substantial compliance with the requirements of this chapter is sufficient to 
hold and claim a lien. 
(3)(a) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail 
by certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to: (i) the reputed owner of the real property; 
or (ii) the record owner of the real property. 
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the lien 
claimant, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of the 
record owner, using the names and addresses appearing on the last completed real 
property assessment rolls of the county where the affected property is located. 
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record 
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees 
against the reputed owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
(4) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make rules governing 
the form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(a)(ix). 
ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-33 (2008) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-33 (2008). 
(1) (a) Upon final completion of a construction project: 
(i) an owner of a construction project or an original contractor may file a notice of 
completion with the database; and 
(ii) a lender that has provided financing for the construction project, a surety that has 
provided bonding for the construction project, or a title company issuing a title insurance 
policy on the construction project, may file a notice of completion. 
(b) Notwithstanding Section 38-1-2, if a subcontractor performs substantial work after 
the applicable dates established by Subsections (l)(a)(i) and (ii), that subcontractor's 
subcontract is considered an original contract for the sole purpose of determining: 
(i) the subcontractor's time frame to file a notice to hold and claim a lien under 
Subsection 38-1-7(1); and 
(ii) the original contractor's time frame to file a notice to hold and claim a lien under 
Subsection 38-1-7(1) for that subcontractor's work. 
(c) A notice of completion shall include: 
(i) the building permit number for the project, or the number assigned to the project by 
the designated agent; 
(ii) the name, address, and telephone number of the person filing the notice of 
completion; 
(iii) the name of the original contractor for the project; 
(iv) the address of the project or a description of the location of the project; 
(v) the date on which final completion is alleged to have occurred; and 
(vi) the method used to determine final completion. 
(d) For purposes of this section, final completion of the original contract does not 
occur if work remains to be completed for which the owner is holding payment to ensure 
completion of the work. 
(e) (i) Unless a person indicates to the division or designated agent that the person 
does not wish to receive a notice under this section, electronic notification of the filing of 
a notice of completion or alternate notice as prescribed in Subsection (l)(a), shall be 
provided to: 
(A) each person that filed a notice of commencement for the project; 
(B) each person that filed preliminary notice for the project; and 
(C) all interested persons who have requested notices concerning the project. 
(ii) A person to whom notice is required under this Subsection (1) (e) is responsible 
for: 
(A) providing an e-mail address, mailing address, or telefax number to which a notice 
required by this Subsection (l)(e) is to be sent; and 
(B) the accuracy of any e-mail address, mailing address, or telefax number to which 
notice is to be sent. 
(iii) The designated agent fulfills the notice requirement of Subsection (1) (e)(i) when 
it sends the notice to the e-mail address, mailing address, or telefax number provided to 
the designated agent, whether or not the notice is actually received. 
(iv) Upon the filing of a notice of completion, the time periods for filing preliminary 
notices stated in Section 38-1-27 are modified such that all preliminary notices shall be 
filed subsequent to the notice of completion and within ten days from the day on which 
the notice of completion is filed. 
(f) A subcontract that is considered an original contract for purposes of this section 
does not create a requirement for an additional preliminary notice if a preliminary notice 
has already been given for the labor, service, equipment, and material furnished to the 
subcontractor who performs substantial work. 
(2) (a) If a construction project owner, original contractor, subcontractor, or other 
interested person believes that a notice of completion has been filed erroneously, that 
owner, original contractor, subcontractor, or other interested person can request from the 
person who filed the notice of completion evidence establishing the validity of the notice 
of completion. 
(b) Within ten days after the request described in Subsection (2)(a), the person who 
filed the notice of completion shall provide the requesting person proof that the notice of 
completion is valid. 
(c) If the person that filed the notice of completion does not provide proof of the 
validity of the notice of completion, that person shall immediately cancel the notice of 
completion from the database in any manner prescribed by the division pursuant to rule. 
(3) A person filing a notice of completion by alternate filing is responsible for 
verifying and changing any incorrect information in the notice of completion before the 
expiration of the time period during which the notice is required to be filed. 
ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 (2008). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 (2008). 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful property 
interest in certain real property, including an owner, title holder, mortgagee, trustee, or 
beneficial owner. 
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real properly who offers a 
document for recording or filing with any county recorder in the state asserting a lien, or 
notice of interest, or other claim of interest in certain real property. 
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in certain real property. 
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful 
property interest in certain real property, including an owner, titleholder, mortgagee, 
trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and interest in that real property appears in 
the county recorder's records for the county in which the property is located. 
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest in certain real 
property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's records for the county in which the 
property is located. 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien, notice of interest, 
or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is 
recorded or filed is not: (a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal 
statute; (b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state; or (c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by 
the owner of the real property. 
ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-2 (2008). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-2 (2008). 
(l)(a) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1, 38-9-3, 38-9-4, and 38-9-6 apply to any 
recording or filing or any rejected recording or filing of a lien pursuant to this chapter on 
or after May 5, 1997. (b) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1 and 38-9-7 apply to all liens 
of record regardless of the date the lien was recorded or filed, (c) Notwithstanding 
Subsections (l)(a) and (b), the provisions of this chapter applicable to the filing of a 
notice of interest do not apply to a notice of interest filed before May 5, 2008. 
(2) The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a person from filing a lis pendens in 
accordance with Section 78B-6-1303 or seeking any other relief permitted by law. 
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 who 
files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter I, Mechanics' Liens. 
ADDENDUM 
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MECHANICS' LIENS 38-1-7 
arc concurrent as to one fund, 36 A. L. E. or time when labor or material for which 
663. lien is claimed was furnished as date of 
Time when contractor commenced work mechanic's lien, 83 A. L. R. 925. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
1. Commencement and duration of lien. tcrials. Morrison v. Inter-Mountain Salt 
Under former s ta tute , lien of subcon- Co.. 14 V. 201, 46 P. .1104, following Mor-
tractor at tached on date of subcontractor's rison v. Carey-Lombard Co., 9 U. 70, 33 
commencing 1o do work or to furnish ma- P. 238. 
38-1-6. Priority over claims of creditors of original contractor or sub-
contractor.—No attachment, garnishment or levy under an execution upon 
any money due to an original contractor from the owner of any property 
subject to lien under this chapter shall be valid as against any lien of a 
subcontractor or materialman, and no such attachment, garnishment or 
levy upon any money due to a subcontractor or materialman from the 
contractor shall be valid as against any lien of a laborer employed by the 
day or piece. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, tory contract, for sale of property as af-
§1380; C. L. 1917, §3730; R. S. 1933 & C. feeling purchaser's interest, 47 A. L. B. 
1943, 52-1-6. " 263. 
Priori ty as between art isan 's lien and 
Comparable Provision. chattel mortgage, 36 A. L. R. 2d 229. 
Iowa Code Ann., § 572.19 (mechanics' Pr ior i ty as between lien for repairs and 
liens take priority of all garnishments right of seller under conditional sales 
of owner for contract debts, whether contract, 30 A. L. R. 2d 198. 
made prior or subsequent to commence- Priori ty as between mechanic's lien and 
ment of furnishing of material or per- purchase-money mortgage, 72 A. L. B . 
formance of labor, without regard to 1516, 73 A. L. R. 2d 1407. 
date of filing claim for such l ien) . Pr ior i ty as between mortgage for future 
advances and mechanics' liens, 80 A. L. 
Collateral References. j>. 2d 179. 
Mechanics' Liens<2=>198. Remedy available to holder of mechan-
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 197. ic's lien which has priority over antecedent 
mortgage or vendor's ti t le or lien as re-
Character of service contemplated by gards improvement, but not as regards 
statutes giving a lien or preference, in laud, where it is impossible or impractical 
event of insolvency, to servants, em- to remove the improvement, 107 A. L. R. 
ployees, laborers, etc., 142 A. L. R. 362. 1012. 
Constitutionality of s tatute giving to Right or interest subject to, and priority 
lien for alteration of property, pursuant of, s tatutory lien for labor or material in 
to public requirement, preference over pre- developing property for oil and gas, 122 
existing mechanic's lien or similar lien, 121 A. L. R. 1182. 
A. L. R. 616, 141 A. L. R. 66. Rule as to marshaling assets where liens 
Lien for labor or material furnished un- are concurrent as to one fund, 36 A. L. 
der contract with vendor pending execu- R. 663. 
38-1-7. Notice of claim—Contents—Recording.—Every original con-
tractor within eighty days after the completion of his contract, and except 
as hereafter provided, every person other than the original contractor 
claiming the benefit of this chapter within sixty days after furnishing the 
last material or performing the last labor for or on any land, building, 
improvement or structure, or for any alteration, addition to or repair 
thereof, or performance of any labor in, or furnishing any materials for, 
any mine or mining claim, must file for record with the county recorder of 
the county in which the property, or some part thereof, is situated a claim 
in writing, containing a notice of intention to hold and claim a lien, and 
a statement of his demand after deducting all just credits and offsets, 
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with the name of the owner, if known, and also the name of the person by 
whom he was employed or to whom he furnished the material, with a state-
ment of the terms, time given and conditions of his contract, specifyin» 
the time when the first and last labor was performed, or the first and last 
material was furnished, and also a description of the property to be 
charged with the lien, sufficient for identification, which claim must be 
verified by the oath of himself or of some other person. 
When a subcontractor or any person furnishes labor or material as 
stated above at the instance and request of an original contractor, then 
such subcontractor's or person's lien rights, as set forth herein, are ex-
tended so as to make the final date for the filing of a notice of intention; 
to hold and claim a lien sixty days after completion of the original contract 
of the original contractor. 
History: R. S. 1898 & O. L. 1907, 
§1386; C. I*. 1917, §3736; L. 1931, ch. 6, 
§ 1; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-7; L. 1949, 
ch. 63, § 1. 
Compiler's Note. 
The 1949 amendment added the last 
paragraph. 
Comparable Provisions. 
California Civ. Proc. Code, § 1193.1, 
subd. (c) (must file notice of completion 
of work for record; if filed, original con-
tractor has sixty days in which to file 
claim, all others, th i r ty days; if not filed, 
claim must be filed ninety days after com-
pletion of work) . 
Idaho Code Ann., § 45-507 (substantially 
the same, except tha t original contractor 
must file "within ninety days") . 
Iowa Code Ann., §§ 572.8, 572.9 (similar; 
principal contractor must file within ninety 
days; subcontractor, within sixty days) . 
Montana Rev. Codes 1947, §45-502 
(every person must file "within ninety 
days") . 
1. In general. 
Cited in Holbrook v. Webster's Inc., 7 
IT. (2d) 148, 320 P. 2d 661. 
2. "Person" defined. 
The word "person" in this section in-
cludes a corporation. Doane v. Clinton, 
2 IT. 417. 
3. Operation and effect of section. 
This section gives the subcontractor a 
lien, and it also gives a lien to the per-
son who performs labor on the building, 
or furnishes material under a contract 
with such subcontractor. Teahen v. Kelson, 
6 U. 363, 23 P . 764. 
4. Compliance with section. 
Nothing more than compliance with the 
provisions of this section can be required 
of claimant in order for him to secure 
his right to lien. Brubaker v. Bennett 19 
U. 401, 57 P . 170. 
5. Perfection of l ien in general. 
Lion is not created unti l contractor files 
for record the s tatement and notice re-
quired by law. Elwell v. Morrow, 28 U 
278, 78 P . 605. 
6. Sufficiency of notice. 
Essential averments, omitted in notice 
of lien, were incapable of being supplied 
by averments in complaint or by extrinsic 
evidence. Morrison, Merrill & Co. v. Wil-
lard, 17 U. 306, 53 P . 832, 70 Am. St. Rep. 
784. 
Any notice which conforms to provisions 
of this section is sufficient. Brubaker v. 
Bennett , 19 U. 401, 57 P . 170. 
Notice of intention to claim lien for 
materials furnished for erection of two 
buildings was not insufficient on ground 
tha t amount due on each one of buildings 
was not separately stated. Eccles Lumber 
Co. v. Mart in , 31 U. 241, 87 P . 713. 
For purpose of acquiring mechanic's 
lien against mining claims where oper-
ated as mine, necessary appurtenances^ 
including easement in adjoining ^ land, 
were not required to be mentioned in no-
tice of intention to claim lien. Pa rk City 
Meat Co. v. Comstock Silver King Min. 
Co., 36 U. 145, 103 P . 254. 
Necessary appurtenances, including ease-
ment which extended outside of boundaries 
of land upon which building was erected, 
were not required to be mentioned in no-
tice of intention to claim lien. Park City 
Meat Co. v. Comstock Silver King Min. 
Co., 36 IT. 145, 103 P . 254. 
A notice of lien by materialman, which 
clearly showed tha t building materials 
were furnished owner, and used on and 
about house on land fully and legally de-
scribed by lot and subdivision, and which 
recited tha t owner agreed to pay cash, 
was sufficient to substantially comply with 
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this section. Chase v. Dawson, 117 U. 295, 
215 P . 2d 390. 
Where the basic requirements of creat-
ing a lien are met it is not essential tha t 
the names of others whoso interests might 
be affected be listed on the notices of the 
lien. Buehner Block Co. -v. Glezos, 6 IT. 
(2d) 226, 310 P . 2d 517. 
Where labor is performed or mat d i a l s 
furnished upon several buildings owned 
by the same person or peisons, a claimant 
may include in one claim all amounts due, 
and the claim will not be defective if the 
amount due on each separate building is 
not designated. Utali Savings & Loan 
Assn. v. Mecham, 12 U. (2d) 335, 366 P . 
2d 598. 
If a claimant files a lien against more 
than one piece of property belonging to 
the same owner without designating the 
amount due on each building or improve-
ment, he may enforce the lien against the 
owner; however, if there are other lien 
claimants of the same class, his claim is 
subordinate to theirs if the claims of the 
latter are against only one of the build-
ings or if they complied with 38-1-8. Utah 
Savings & Loan Assn. v. Mecham, 12 U. 
(2d) 335, 366 P . 2d 598. 
7. —subcontractor's notice. 
Subcontractor 's notice of claim of lien 
held insufficient as against owner of prop-
erty on which lien was claimed. Morrison, 
Merrill & Co. v. Willard, 17 U. 306, 53 P . 
832, 70 Am. St. Rep. 784. 
Subcontractor is not required to state, 
in his notice, any of terms or conditions 
of contract between owner and original 
contractor. Brubakcr v. Bennett , 39 U. 
401, 57 P . 170. 
8. —time of filing. 
Mechanic's lien filed within time speci-
fied by this section takes effect as of date 
of commencement of work and furnishing 
of materials, and is prior to intervening 
equities. Sanford v. Kunkel , 30 IT. 379, 85 
P . 363, 85 P . 1012. 
Under this section, where an owner ex-
ercised his contract r ight to change con-
tractors, a mechanic's lien notice is in 
time when filed over sixty days after the 
first contractor quit, but within sixty 
days after delivering material to the sec-
ond contractor, for the contract is con-
tinuing. Langton Lime & Cement Co. v. 
Pcery, 48 U. 112, 159 P . 49. 
Plaintiff, who contended that project 
was not finally completed until ii Novem-
ber, 1962, although defendant asserted 
that all work done by plaintiff was com-
pleted during the spring of 1962, had the 
burden of demonstrat ing tha t his lien 
was filed within the eighty-day period on 
appeal to the Supreme Court where the 
trial court resolved the controversy 
against the plaintiff, ruling that his claim 
of lien was invalid. Nagle v. Club Fon-
tainbleu, 17 U. (2d) 125, 405 P . 2d 346. 
9. —time of filing—extension. 
Under this section i t is important to 
determine when contract was "completed," 
and when the "last mater ia l" was fur-
nished, or the "last labor" performed, for 
until such is the case the time has not 
begun to run as prescribed hereunder, but 
time to file notice is extended until such 
is the case. See Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 U. 
503, 56 P . 2d 1. 
The element of work done at the own-
er's request has had considerable weight 
in w*orking an extension of time. Where 
materials are furnished or labor per-
formed at owner's request to remedy de-
fects, the question of bad faith on par t 
of lien claimant is eliminated. Wilcox v. 
Cloward, 88 U. 503, 56 P . 2d 1. 
A leaky roof needing a hundred shingles 
to repair it, and a plumbing contract 
where the range boiler still needed to be 
connected up, are not " t r ivia l imperfec-
t ions" but constitute work within pur-
view of claimant 's contract so as to extend 
the time for filing the notice of lien. 
Such as this consti tutes work done satis-
factorily to complete a contract, and with-
out which the owner would not be required 
to accept the job. Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 
U. 503, 56 P . 2d 1. 
Time to complete small jobs incidental 
to completion of contracted obligations 
was sufficient to extend time to file notice 
of lien under this section providing such 
small jobs were necessary and not invent-
ed to merelv extend the s ta tutory period. 
Totorica v."Thomas, 16 U. (2d) 175, 397 
P . 2d 984. 
10. Statement of demand. 
I t is evident tha t the filing of the state-
ment does not create the lien, but simply 
holds it or keeps i t in force for the period 
of twelve months as provided in 38-1-11, 
so as to give the claimant an opportunity 
to enforce the same by process of law. 
Morrison v. Carey-Lombard Co., 9 U. 70, 
33 P . 238. 
Lien claimant must substantially com-
ply with all of requirements of s ta tute in 
btatemeut of his claim for lien, and in 
all essenti.il part iculars such statement 
must be true. Morrison, Merrill & Co. 
v. Willard, 17 U. 306, 53 P. 832, 70 Am. 
St. Bep. 784. 
11. Scope and extent of lien. 
Owner, in his dealings with contractor, 
is charged with notice that subcontractor 
is entitled, under his subcontract, to lien 
within limits of original contract price. 
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Laws of the Territory of Utah, Title IV, Chapter I, Sec, 1062 
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EnjorvviiH'iit of Liens 
DEFINITION OF LIEXS. 
SEC. 105G. A lien is a charge imposed upon specify 
Property, by which it is made security for the performance 
<>f an act. w 
•*t 
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND OTHERS 
PROPERTY. 
UPON REAL 
SEC. 1057. Every person performing labor upon, or 
furnishing materials to be used in the construction, alteiv 
&\')i>» or JTpair of any muring r)aimf bjrihYwg, wharf 
bridge, ditch, flume, tunnel, fence, machinery, railroad 4 
wagon road, aqueduct to create hydraulic power, or any 2 
other structure, or who performs labor in any mining 
claim, ha> a lien upon the same for the work or labor done 
°l* materials furnished by each respectively, whether don^ 
ov furnished at the instance of the owner of the building 
<>c other improvement, or his agent, but the aggregate 
ittnount of such liens must not exceed the amount which, 
the owner would be otherwise liable to pay. 
SEC. 10 ">8. Any Mib-eontraetor, material man
 % 
laborer, or other person performing labor or furnishing'^J 
'Materials for a contractor who is entitled bo a lien unde^"~ 
the provisions of the last section, may, at any time withi 
h've days after commencing to perform the labor or furnSlf 
the materials serve upon the owner or his agent, or the perS 
S(>n employing the contractor, written notice of the amount 
due him for such labor or materials, and such sub-coir> ^ 
tractor, material man, laborer, or other person may havett>2 
lien f° r s u c n amount. And any person fm 
materials, or performing labor for a contractor,
 x 
like notice to the contraci-or, be subrogated to the r 
such sub-contractor. 
SEC. 1059. Any person, who at the reguesl 
owner of any lot in any incorporated city or town 
fills in, or otherwise improves the same, or the <= 
front of, or adjoining the same, has a lien upoi\ 
for his work done and materials furnished. 
SEC. 1060. The land upon which any build 
nrovement or structure is constructed, together wit] 
venicut >paee about the .same, or *o much a.N 
required for the convenient use and occupation th 
also subject to the liens, if, at the time the work
 M 
meneed or the materials for the same had com m eric 
furnished, the land belonged to the person who QUI 
building, improvement \>r structure to be <x>n< 
altered or repaired; but If such person owned less 
fee simple estate in such land, then only his 
therein is subject to such lien. 
SEC. 1061. The liens provided for in this 
are preferred to any lien, mortgage or other incm 
which may have attached subsequent to the time ^ 
building, improvement, or structure was commence 
clone, or materials wrere commenced to be furnish< 
to any lien, mortgage, or other incumbrance of w 
lienholder had no notice and which was unrecord, 
time the building, improvement or structure u 
menced, work done, or tthe materials were com^ 
be furnished. ) 
SEC. 1062. Every original contractor, witl 
days after the completion of his contract, and eve\v 
save the original contractor, claiming the benefit 
Chapter, mu&t within thirty days after the conip 
any building, improvement, or structure, or after j 
pletion of the alteration or repair thereof, or the 
mice of any labor in a mining claim, tile for re<j 
the county recorder of the county in which such 
or some part thereof is situated, a claim containing 
ment of his demand, after deducting all just credit* 
sets, with the name oj* the owner or reputed c 
known, and also the na*'ie of the person by whor 
employed or to whom|jie furnished the materia 
statement of the termsjfiine given, and conditio^ 
contract, and also a description of the proper 
charged with the lien, sufficient for identirieaticj] 
LYWS OF UTAH. 
LAWS OF UTAH. 
TITLE IV. 
C H A P T E R I . 
Enforcement of Liens. 
DEFINITION OF TJENS. 
1056. A lien is a charge imposed upon specific 
by w hieh it is made security for the performance 
OF MECHANICS AND OTHERS UPON 
P R O P E R T Y . 
RE \L 
1057. Everv poison performing labor upon, or 
r materials to be used in the construction, altcr-
"ropair of any mining claim, building, wharl, 
itch, flume, tunnel, fence, machinery, railroad, 
ad, aqueduct to create hydraulic power, or an; 
icture, or who performs labor in any nmimG 
. a lien upon the same for the work 01 labor (tone 
iK furnished by each respectively, whether dont 
led at the instance of the owner of the buildup 
improvement, or his agent, but the a g g i ^ 
f such liens must not exceed the amount \W»ci 
r would be otherwise liable to pay. 
10">8. Any Mib-eontractor, mah nal nia ^ 
>r other person performing labor or furnish"* 
for a contractor who is entitled to a ben una* 
sions of the last section, may, at any t i m % ^ ^ 
after commencing to perform the labor or turn 
•ials serve upon the owner or his agent, or the pe 
oving the contractor, written notice of the anio 
for such labor or materials, and such sub-w 
material man, laborer, or other person may na 
\w\ for such amount. And any person furnishing 
materials, or performing labor foi a contractor, may, by 
Me notice to the contractor, be subrogated to the rights of 
$aeh -nb-oontraetor. 
$ / S S E C . 1059. Any peison, who a t t h e recpust of the , Kns foi krad 
-mnier of any lot in anv incorporated city or town, grades, mp. mimgfots 
^ . ii ^ i.1 ,i , , • and streets 
|Us an, or otherwise improves the same, or the street in 
fent of, or adjoining the same, has a lien upon such lot 
ifjr'his work done and materials furnished. 
1 W SEC. 1060. The land upon which any building, im- what interest .n 
movement or structure is constructed, together with a con- l^cnhCsnubjeu 
^ r a e n t space about the same, or so much as may be 
[toired for the convenient use and occupation thereof, is 
subject to the liens, if, at the time the work was eom-
| | ( ! or the materials for the same had commenced to be 
rished, the land belonged to the person who caused said 
jAuilding, improvement or structure to be constructed, 
f^lfaed or repaired; but if such person owned less than a 
^TOi^iraple estate in such land, then only his interest 
A
 '&rein is subject to such lien. 
"V SEC. 1061. The lien* provided for in this Chapter
 FffcCl of ,lcnN 
r are preferred to any lien, mortgage or other incumbrance, 
• ^ which may have attached subsequent to the time when the 
.^ luilding, improvement, or structure was commenced, work 
k $<&*£, or materials were commenced to be furnished; also, 
r*tOfiny lien, mortgage, or other incumbrance of which the 
j^JJI^aQlder had no notice and which was unrecorded at the 
fM%^ the building, improvement or structure was com-
fc **&&iced, work done, or the materials w ere commenced to 
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action brought thereupon at his own expense; and duri i lKj 
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deduct from any amount due, or to become due by him to 
the contractor, the amount of such judgment and costs. 
S E C 1068. In every case in which different liens 
are asserted against any property, the court in the judg-
l^nent must declare the rank of each lien, or class of liens, 
p which shall be in the following order, \ iz : Firbt—All 
persons other than the original contractors and sub-con-
tractors; Second—The sub-contractors; Third—The orig-
inal contractors. And the proceeds of the sale of the 
property must be applied to eacli lien, or class of liens, in 
the order of its rank, and whenever, on the sale of the 
3/ property subject to the lien, there is a deficiency of p r -
ejudgment may be docketed for the deficiency in like 
ner and with like effect as in actions for the forec-
losure of mortgages. 
SEC. 1069. Any number of persons claiming liens ( ?*~ may join or intervene in the same actions*, and when sep-|t*arate actions are commenced, the court may consolidate g^them. The court may also allow, as part of the costs, the 
** moneys paid for filing and recording the lien. 
SEC. 1070. Nothing contained in thi< Chapter shall 
he construed to impair or affect the right of am person to 
whom any debt may be due for work done, or materials 
furnished, to maintain a personal action to recover Mich 
debt against the pei\son liable therefor. 
SEC. 1071. Except as otherwise provided in this 
Chapter, the provisions of this Code relating to civil ac-
tions, new trials and appeals, are applicable to, and consti-
JC tute the rules c>f practice in the proceedings mentioned in 
| .this Chapter. 
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SEC. 1076. The following acts or omissions, in 
respect to a court of justice or proceedings therein, are 
contempts of authority of the court: 
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Appeal from District Court, Weber County; J. A. 
Howell, Judge. 
Action by the Eccles Lumber Company against Ann 
H. Martin, executrix of James E. Horrocks, deceased, 
and others. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff 
appeals. Reversed and remanded. 
*714 T. D. Skeen, for appellant. 
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FRICK, J. 
This action was commenced to foreclose a mechanic's 
lien; judgment of dismissal being entered upon a de-
murrer to the complaint. With the hope of assisting to 
a better understanding of the views herein after ex-
pressed, we will, in our own way, make a somewhat 
extended statement of the facts contained in the com-
plaint, which, after stating the corporate existence of 
the appellant, is, in substance, as follows: 
That James E. Horrocks, during his lifetime, and at all 
times mentioned in the complaint, was the owner in 
fee of certain real estate in Ogden City, Utah, de-
scribed as follows: Part of lot twenty-seven (27), block 
four (4), of South Ogden survey addition to Ogden 
City, Weber county, Utah, to wit, beginning at the 
northwest corner of said lot twenty-seven (27); thence 
east 162 feet; thence south 132 feet; thence west 30 
feet; thence north 66 feet; thence west 132 feet; thence 
north 66 feet to the place of beginning. That on or 
about the 1st day of September, 1904, said Horrocks 
entered into a written contract with respondent Pe-
terson, whereby said Peterson agreed to build for said 
Horrocks two frame dwelling houses upon the real 
estate above described, and to furnish and provide all 
of the lumber, building material, and labor necessary 
to complete said houses, and to complete the same on 
or before the 1st day of November, 1904, all for *715 
the sum of $2,750, to be paid by said Horrocks to said 
Peterson; payment to be made in installments as the 
work on said houses progressed, and the last payment 
of $500 was to be made when said houses were fully 
completed. That thereafter, on the 6th day of Sep-
tember, 1904, said Peterson, by a written contract, 
sublet the construction of said houses, together with 
the furnishing of certain specified material, to the 
respondent Fred. Howard. Said Howard agreed to 
complete said houses within 36 working days from 
said date, and to receive the sum of $1,575 for what he 
agreed to do, payments to be made from time to time, 
the last payment of $775 to be made when said houses 
were completed. That thereafter, on the 19th day of 
September, 1904, said Howard entered into a contract 
with appellant, whereby appellant agreed to furnish 
said Howard with lumber and other specified material 
necessary to complete said houses. That in pursuance 
of said agreement, and with the assent and approval of 
said Peterson, the original contractor, and said Hor-
rocks, the owner of the premises above described, 
appellant, between the 19th day of September and the 
25th day of October, 1904, sold, furnished, and deli-
vered said building material to said Howard upon said 
premises to be and which was actually used in the 
construction of said houses, amounting in all, ac-
cording to the prices agreed upon, and after deducting 
all credits, to the sum of $710.48. That said contracts 
were entire, and appellant is unable to state the amount 
due or the sum paid on each of said houses separately. 
That the appellant furnished all the lumber and 
building material required to complete said houses. 
That the same was to be paid for on the 1st day of the 
month succeeding the date of delivery. That no pay-
ments were made for the construction work of said 
houses before the first material was actually furnished 
by the appellant, except the sum of $600. That within 
40 days from the date of delivery of the last material, 
the appellant filed with the county recorder of Weber 
county, and caused to be recorded, a notice of inten-
tion to claim, and did claim, a mechanic's lien upon the 
real estate above described. The notice so filed and 
recorded was duly verified, and in detail complied 
with the requirements of section 1386, Rev. St. 1898, 
all of which is stated in the complaint. That said 
Horrocks died on the 20th day of March, 1905, leaving 
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a last will, wherein the respondent Ann H. Martin was 
named as executrix, which will was thereafter on the 
29th day of June, 1905, duly admitted to probate, and 
that letters testamentary were duly issued to said Ann 
H. Martin, and that she is the duly qualified executrix 
of the last will of said James E. Horrocks, deceased. 
That the appellant duly presented its claim for the 
amount claimed, with interest and costs, to said ex-
ecutrix for allowance against said estate. That the 
same was disallowed and rejected by her, and she 
refused to pay the same or any part thereof. A copy of 
the notice of intention to claim a lien is attached to said 
complaint, and made a part thereof. The notice sets 
forth in detail all matters required by section 1386, 
Rev. St 1898, but fails to state the amount due to the 
claimant on each building separately. 
Upon substantially the foregoing facts, the appellant 
prayed judgment for the amount of its claim, to fo-
reclose said lien, for the sale of the property, and for 
general relief To this complaint the respondent Ann 
H. Martin, as executrix of the said last will, interposed 
a general demurrer upon the sole ground that said 
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action either against her or the estate of the 
deceased, and that the facts stated are insufficient to 
entitle appellant to the relief prayed for. The trial court 
sustained this demurrer, and the appellant, refusing to 
further amend the complaint, but electing to stand 
thereon, judgment dismissing the action and for costs 
was directed to be rendered against the appellant, from 
which judgment this appeal is prosecuted. 
The only question presented by this record therefore 
is, did the court err in sustaining said demurrer and in 
entering judgment dismissing the action as above 
stated'? The trial court held that the notice of intention 
to claim a lien was insufficient, for the reason that the 
amount due on each one of the two houses was not 
separately stated, and that therefore there was no lien, 
and hence the judgment dismissing the action. In order 
to determine the correctness of the court's ruling, it 
becomes necessary to analyze and construe sections 
1386 and 1387, c. 1, tit. 39, Rev. St. 1898, entitled 
"Mechanics' Liens." This chapter is composed of 28 
sections consecutively numbered from 1373 to 
1400. In those sections is contained an entire system 
or scheme respecting the creation of mechanics' liens 
in favor of persons who furnish any material, or per-
form any labor, or render any skill or service for any 
improvements on land. By the various amendments to 
the original law from time to time, and as the same has 
been construed by this and other courts under similar 
statutes, a mechanic's lien attaches to the land, and, 
unless the person against whom the claim for a me-
chanic's lien is made has some interest or estate in the 
land upon which the improvement is made, no lien 
attaches to the improvement as such; further, that a 
contract express or implied must have been made with 
the owner of the land or his authorized agent in order 
to successfully initiate a lien. Morrison, Merrill & 
Co. v. Clark. 20 Utah, 432, 59 Pac 235, 77 Am St. 
Rep. 924:Earlv v. Burt, 68 Iowa, 716, 28 N. W. 
35;Huff v. Jolly, 41 Kan. 537, 21 Pac. 646;Fetter v. 
Wilson, 51 Kv. 90;Wagar v. Btiscoe, 38 Mich. 
587-595. The case of *716Sanford v. Kunkel (Utah) 
85 Pac. 363, in no way departs from the doctrine that 
in order to acquire a lien an interest in the real estate 
upon which the improvements are made is necessary. 
That case is based upon the sound equitable doctrine 
that where the law has given a right to one person it 
cannot be destroyed by the wrongful act of another. 
Having thus reached the conclusion that under our 
present statute a mechanic's lien can only be acquired 
on land, and that the buildings or improvements are to 
be taken as appurtenant merely, we will proceed to an 
examination of our statutes to determine whether the 
lien in question is void or valid. Section 1386, in 
which are,Q08£aiaed the matters .which jcajist be stated 
in a n o t i c e ^ ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f -
loj|s; "Every^origMl contractor, w ^ ^ ^ f f i ^ ^ ^ y s 
a^r4^£cptople$ion of his7<:ontract, and ev.eryfp8Sbn 
save the original contractor claiming the benefit of this 
chapter, must, within forty days after furnishing the 
lasl material or performing' the last labor for any 
building, improvement, or structure, or for any altera-
tion, addition to, or repair thereof, or performance of 
any labor in or furnishing any materials for any mining 
claim, file for record with the county recorder of the 
county in which the property or some part thereof is 
situated, a claim in writing containing a notice of 
intention to hold and claim a lien, and a statement of 
his demand, after deducting all just credits and offsets, 
with the name of the owner, if known, and also the 
name of the person by whom he was employed, or to 
whom he furnished the material, with a statement of 
the terms, time given, and conditions of his contract, 
specifying the time when the first and last labor was 
performed, or the first and last material furnished, and 
also a description of the property to be charged with 
the lien, sufficient for identification, which claim must 
be verified by the oath of himself or of some other 
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person." This is followed by section 1387, which is as 
follows: "Liens against two or more buildings, mining 
claims, or other improvements owned by the same 
person or persons may be included in one claim; but in 
such case the person filing the claim must designate 
therein the amount claimed to be due to him on each of 
such buildings, mining claims, or other improve-
ments." These sections must be construed in connec-
tion with each other, and the two together must be 
construed in connection with other provisions con-
tained in the whole of chapter 1 aforesaid. In order to 
arrive at the true legislative intent, courts cannot se-
gregate a section or a part of an entire chapter upon a 
given subject, and from such part alone determine the 
true meaning or intent of the whole. Moreover, the 
object or purpose of the law as a whole must be con-
sidered. If often occurs that, in a series of sections 
relating to one subject, provisions are found in one or 
more sections that are in seeming conflict with other 
sections or parts of the same act. It also occurs that in 
an act like chapter 1, aforesaid, where rights are 
created, the methods to secure them are prescribed, 
and the procedure provided for to enforce such rights 
as against the property, the owner, and among other 
claimants, certain provisions may be intended to affect 
some and not others. Some of these provisions may be, 
and frequently are, intended for the benefit of some 
who may stand in a particular relation, and not to 
others standing in a different relation to either the 
owner or the property. This is the case with respect to 
our mechanic's lien law, as we shall attempt to show. 
Moreover, as is well stated in Boisot on Mechanics' 
Liens, § 4: "The doctrine upon which the lien is 
founded is the consideration of natural justice, that a 
party who has enhanced the value of property by in-
corporating therein his labor or materials shall have a 
preferred claim on such property for the value of his 
labor or materials." But the respondent contends, and 
the contention is sound, that a mechanic's lien is 
purely statutory, not contractual, and none can be 
acquired unless the claimant has complied with the 
several provisions of the statute creating the lien. We 
yield full assent to this doctrine, and likewise assent 
that, where the statute fails, courts cannot create 
rights, and should not do so by unnatural and forced 
construction. But, while all this is sound doctrine, 
courts should not withhold the benefits intended by a 
series of sections on one subject by a too literal or 
strict construction of one section, or part of the whole 
series, so as to destroy intended effects of other parts. 
It is the true intent and spirit contained in all the sec-
tions upon a given subject that constitutes the law 
upon that subject, not what may be contained in only 
one of them. The rule that in our judgment should 
govern, is, we think, correctly stated in 20 Am. & Eng. 
Ency. Law, on page 276, where the author says: "A 
lien once acquired by labor performed on a building 
with the consent of the owner should not, however, be 
defeated by technicalities, when no rights of others are 
infringed, and no express command of the statute is 
disregarded." With these rules and principles in mind, 
we are prepared to proceed to an analysis of sections 
1386 and 1387. Such an analysis becomes necessary, 
for the reason that this court has in no case that we are 
aware of, either done so or attempted to do so. True, 
the question was raised in the case of Garner v. Van 
Patten, 20 Utah, 342, 58 Pac. 684, but, as the court in 
that case sustained the lien, although, as appears from 
the case, the claimant had not strictly complied with 
the provisions of section 1387, the question here pre-
sented, if decided at all, was adverse to the respondent 
in this case. The question in this case *717 is, can a 
claimant obtain a valid lien as against an owner of 
property upon which the lien is claimed without in-
cluding the statement required by section 1387? We 
think he can, for the following reasons: 
It will be observed that by the provisions of section 
1386, wherein are prescribed the necessary acts to be 
done by the claimant to acquire a lien, it is provided 
among other things that the claimant shall make "a 
statement of his demand after deducting all just credits 
and offsets." The owner is thus fairly informed of the 
amount claimed against his property. If the amount is 
correct, he will have this amount to pay-no more, no 
less-to discharge the lien. If it is incorrect, he is fully 
apprised of the fact, and can make his defense. He 
therefore is not concerned in case the lien is claimed 
on more than one building erected upon one parcel of 
land, what amount is due on one or the other of the 
buildings. The lien is an entirety against the whole 
parcel of land and the improvements appurtenant 
thereto. As we read the mechanic's lien law, it was not 
intended that the provisions contained in section 1387 
were intended either as an essential in acquiring a lien, 
or made for the benefit of the owner. The lien is 
complete by complying with section 1386. The 
statement of the amount due on buildings separately, 
as provided in section 1387, would be but a restate-
ment of the amount of the claim as required by section 
1386, in another form. As we view it, this restatement 
was not intended as an essential part in acquiring the 
lien. It could subserve no purpose to attain that end. It 
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could in no way affect the amount claimed against the 
entire property. It, however, subserves a purpose in 
respect to different lien claimants claiming liens 
against several houses or improvements erected on 
different parcels of land included in one lien. To de-
termine the equities as between lien claimants of the 
same class where the law requires them to prorate, it is 
important to determine the exact amount due to each 
claimant upon each of the several buildings or im-
provements erected on different parcels of land in 
order to prevent one from getting more than his share 
in case the proceeds of a sale of the property are in-
sufficient to satisfy all the claimants in full. This, 
however, does not affect nor concern the owner of the 
property, nor does it affect the validity of the lien as 
such, as against him or the property. But it is argued 
that effect must be given to all the requirements of the 
statute respecting the things to be done to acquire a 
lien. This is true, but, as we have attempted to show, a 
discrimination must be made between the things that 
are necessary to acquire a lien and those thai are 
merely intended to protect the interests of the lien 
claimants between or among themselves. The state-
ments in section 1387, as we view it, clearly belong to 
the latter class. The statements of the claimant pro-
vided for in section 1386 are made sufficient to ac-
quire a lien and to protect the owner of the property. 
To hold that a restatement of the amount of the claim 
in another form is likewise necessary to acquire a lien, 
unless the statute requires this to be done in terms, is 
adding, by construction, an essential not required by 
the statute. The construction we place upon the sec-
tions quoted gives the language contained therein full 
force and effect. The statement required in section 
1386 of the amount claimed is thus to acquire a lien, 
and the statement in section 1387 is for the purpose 
above indicated. 
But it is further argued-and the argument at first blush 
seems plausible-that while the effect of the two sec-
tions construed together was, as we claim it to be, as 
originally enacted, such is not the case now, because 
section 1387 has been amended, and thereby its effect 
changed. The section corresponding to the present 
section 1387 is found in 2 Comp. Laws 1888, and is 
there designated as section 3812, and reads as follows: 
"In every case in which one claim is filed against two 
or more buildings, mining claims, or other improve-
ments owned by the same person, the person filing 
such claim must at the same time designate the amount 
due him on each of such buildings, mining claims or 
other improvements, otherwise the lien of such claims 
is postponed to other liens. The lien of such claimant 
does not extend beyond the amount designated, as 
against other creditors having liens, by judgment, 
mortgage, or otherwise, upon either of such buildings 
or other improvements, or upon the land upon which 
the same are situated. " The law was recast and 
amended in 1890 (chapter 30, p. 24, Sess. Laws 1890), 
wherein section 3812 is omitted. It was again amended 
in 1894 (Sess. Laws 1894, p. 44, c. 41), where it was 
re-enacted in its present form. It is conceded, in fact no 
one can dispute on reasonable grounds, that, with the 
italicized portion added, the failure ro state the amount 
due on each of several buildings or improvements 
could not invalidate the lien as against the property or 
the owner thereof, but its effect would only be to 
postpone the lien to others in the same class. The logic 
of this admission is a concession that the statement of 
the amount due on each building separately, as re-
quired by section 1387, was not an essential part of the 
lien as such. It is urged that, since the Legislature 
eliminated the provision of what the effect should be 
in case of a failure to make the statement required in 
said section 1387, it was thereby intended to make the 
statement an essential part of the lien itself. We cannot 
yield assent to this deduction. If the Legislature in-
tended that a failure to make such a statement should 
invalidate the lien theretofore valid without it, we 
think it would have said so in plain terms. We think 
that the amendment should not, by mere construction, 
be given that effect unless no other construction is 
reasonable. It frequently occurs*718 that statutes are 
enacted declaratory of some rule of law or equity. Our 
own statutes teem with such instances. The mere fact, 
therefore, that it is enacted into a statute does not 
create the right or remedy, as the case may be. Both 
would exist without the statute. The statute in such 
cases merely states the right without having recourse 
to the original rule. The fact, therefore, of the omission 
of the equitable rule contained in the italicized portion 
of the original section of which section 1387 is an 
amendment in our judgment would not affect the court 
in working out equity between lien claimants. The 
purpose of the omitted portion was to fix the penalty 
for the failure to state separately the amount due on 
each building. Is it reasonable to suppose that the 
Legislature, by removing the mild penalty, thereby 
intended to create a far more drastic one without 
saying so in terms? We do not think so. We think the 
effect of an omission to state the amount claimed on 
each building with and without the omitted portion of 
the section above quoted amounts to this: While that 
portion of the original section was in force, the courts 
a 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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were compelled to enforce the penalty in every case 
where the statement required by section 1387 was 
omitted, whether the equities required it or not, while, 
under the present form of that section, the court is at 
liberty to enforce it or not as justice and equity de-
mand in each particular case The mere fact that sec-
tion 1387 is mandatory m form does not necessarily 
make it so m its effects It is an elementary rule of 
construction that the mere form of the statute does not 
control in this respect Sutherland on Stat Const §§ 
446, 447 
In view of the somewhat singular conditions arising by 
both the terms as well as the conditions of our me-
chanic's hen law, in view of the amendments and 
changes and omissions therein, we have been unable 
to find authorities directly in point upon the matters 
discussed herein The following cases, however, in 
some degree at least, support all the views herein 
expressed These decisions are based upon statutes 
similar in many respects to our own Willamette Co 
v Shea (Or) 32 Pac 759,Lyon v Logan, 68 Tex 521, 
5S W 72, 2 Am St Rep 511 JPhilhps v Gilbert, 101 
U S 725, 25 L Ed 833,Wallv Robinson, 115 Mass 
429,Lax v Peterson, 42 Minn 221, 44 N W 
3,Wheeler v Ralph (Wash) 30 Pac 709 There are 
cases which hold that provisions substantially like 
those contained in section 1387 are essentials m ac-
quiring a hen Whether such provisions are part of the 
section wherein are contained the essentials to acquire 
a hen or not, we cannot determine without recourse to 
the statute creating the lien, and, not having access to 
them, we cannot examine them It is manifest, how-
ever, that the courts that have so held have construed 
the mechanic's lien law with undue strictness Wil-
cox v Woodruff, 61 Conn 578, 24 Atl 521, 1056, 17 
L R A 314, 29 Am St Rep 222, is a fair type of the 
cases holding adversely to the views that we entertain 
In that case, however, there are two able dissenting 
opinions which, to our minds, state the rule of con-
struction respecting mechanic's lien statutes correctly 
The cases of Crawford v Anderson, 129 Ind 117,28 
N E 314,Culver v Elwell, 73 111 536, and some 
others, perhaps, are of the same class None of these 
cases, however, in our judgment, reflect the true spirit 
of our mechanic's hen law, and therefore we decline to 
follow them But there is room for contention that the 
demurrer was erroneously sustained upon another 
ground As appears from the complaint, the contracts, 
and from the description of the property, the whole 
matter was treated as an entirety by all parties in in-
terest This being so, the two buildings were not, 
within the purview of our statutes, to be treated as 
separate buildings This for the reason that all hens of 
any class would prorate upon the whole, regardless as 
to whether the labor was performed on one or the other 
of the buildings, or the material was used in the one or 
the other The very purpose of section 1387 being 
thus eliminated from the claim m this case, a non-
compliance with it cannot affect any rights This 
statement must, of necessity, be taken in the light of 
our construction of the several sections of our hen law 
and their effect in relation to each other as explained in 
this opinion We desire to affirm again that, where a 
statute requires certain things to be done to acquire a 
right, nothing short of a substantial compliance with 
the statute will answer, but where a statute requires 
things to be done in case certain conditions exist, then, 
before the statute can be operative, it must appear that 
the conditions are m fact present If we are right, 
therefore, that m this case the hen and the buildings 
are to be treated as an entirety, then the conditions 
provided for in section 1387 did not exist and the 
section is not applicable These views, as we think, 
are sustained by the following California and other 
cases, which are based on statutes very similar to our 
own Booth v Pendola, 88 Cal 36, 23 Pac 200, 25 
Pac 1101,Warren v Hopkins, 110 Cal 506, 42 Pac 
986,Post v Fleming ( N M ) 6 2 Pac 1087,Idaho M & 
M Co v Davis. 123 Fed 396, 59 C C A 200 
The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause 
remanded with instructions to the district court to 
vacate the judgment, reinstate the case, overrule the 
demurrer, and permit the respondent to answer if she 
is so advised, and proceed with the case in accordance 
with this opinion Costs of this appeal to be taxed 
against respondent 
McCARTY, C J , and STRAUP, J , concur 
Utah 1906 
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ADDENDUM "K 
Appellees' August 13, 2008 Wrongful Lien Letter 
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August 13,2008 
Peterson Plumbing Supply 
Ann. Don Peterson 
90N.600K. 
Richfield. Utah 84701 
Re: Notice of Wrongful Liens 
Deac Mr. Peterson: 
1 appreciate your cordial conversation on the phone this afternoon. As you are aware, 
our office represents General Construction and Development (GCD). Inc. and the other 
owners of the property who were served with Notice of Liens regarding the liens you have 
filed on Building O, Building S, Building X. Building N, Building V and Building W. 1 am 
aware of 30 liens being filed so for. As I informed you today, these liens are wrongful and 
must be removed within 10 days. These liens have caused irrepairable harm and damages to 
my client, GCD, Inc. Dozens of owners have received the Notice of Lien and have contacted 
my client. Because of the owners' lack of understanding of lien laws they believe that GCD. 
Inc. has done something wrong and has not paid their bills. Many of the owners now believe 
that GCD, Inc. is insolvent and about to declare bankruptcy and these rumors have been 
spreading to other owners and the general public. As you are aware, GCD, Inc. still has 
many condominiums for sale. My clients sell their homes by word of mouth and right now 
your wrongful liens have caused the general public to lose faith in the stability of my client. 
GCD, Inc.*" 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-7 specifically states that the Notice of Lien must be tiled 
within 180 days of the time the Certificate of Occupancy is given. There is no ambiguity in 
this statutory requirement and I have litigated this issue before. Your liens were filed after 
the 180 days elapsed and they are therefore not authorized pursuant to the statute. Utah Code 
Ann. §38-9-1 states that if the lien is not authorized by statute then it is a wrongful lien. Mr. 
Peterson, you are aware that General Construction and Development has paid Pace 
Plumbing, Inc. the full price of all the work and materials that were provided to the job. You 
were aware that over 1 80 days had elapsed since the Certificate of Occupancy was given on 
these liens. Further, you never once called GCD, Inc. and informed them that you had not 
been paid by Pace Piumbmg. If General Construction and Development would have known 
that you were not being paid, they would have stopped paying Pace Plumbing and would 
have paid you directly. Your own actions have caused you not to receive payment for those 
materials because you were aware that Pace Plumbing was not paying and you failed to 
provide this knowledge to my clients and failed to protect yourself against further losses. It 
is because of your failures that you are now in this predicament. GCD, Inc. has not done 
yFIt;LM01lE^ 
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anything wrong and they have always paid ail their bills on time and continue lo do so. they 
should not be responsible for your own failures and those of Pace Plumbing. 
Not only are the Notice of Liens filed untimely, but many of the liens contain material 
misstatements or false claims. Many of the Notices of Lien have the last day of the materials 
being provided well after the date the Certificate of Occupancies were given and after the 
buildings were completely finished. It goes without saying that Peterson Plumbing Supply 
could not have provided plumbing materials to a building that was completely finished and 
Certificates of Occupancy issued. 
You are hereby given notice, pursuant to U.C.A. § 38-9-1 et al., that these liens are 
wrongful and you have ten days to release these wrongful liens or you will be liable to my 
client in the amount of SI 0.01)0.00 per wrongful lien or for treble the actual damages, 
whichever is greater. Since 30 liens have been recorded, that is a total of $300,000 you will 
have to pay my clients if the liens are not removed. Further, your actions in filing these 
wrongful liens constitute a Class B misdemeanor pursuant to U.C.A. § 38-1-25. 
Please be aware that my clients will pursue this matter immediately in court if the 
liens are not removed. In Court they will seek the lull amount of damages plus their attorney 
lees. 1-ven if you remove the liens, the damage your actions have caused has already taken 
place and most likely cannot be repaired. Your willful disregard to my client's reputation 
VAK\ good name is disheartening. You could have communicated with Genera! Construction 
and Development many months ago and avoided all of these issues. Further, you could have 
informed them that you were planning to file liens before you actually filed them so thai my 
clients could have had some time to discuss the issue with you and hopefully they could have 
convinced you not to file the liens. Even if you did decide to file the liens, at least my clients 
would have had some time to speak, with the various owners and prepare them for what was 
happening so they would not become so worried. 
My clients hope that they will not have to pursue litigation against you and that you 
will quickly remove the liens. However, if this does not happen within 10 days of today my 
clients will have no other option. Please feci free to call me at my office to discuss these 
issues. 
Respectfully, 
Paul I). Dodd 
Attorney f'orGCD. Inc. 
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Order on Petition to Nullify Liens dated November 14, 2008 
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STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTV 
Paul D.Dodd (10675) 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
Counsel for Petitioners 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801)426-8200 
Facsimile: (801)426-8208 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL CONSTRUCTION & 
DEVELOPMENT, INC, a Utah 
Corporation; BRANDON D. WILSON; 
JUSTIN A. & SHANON HUTCHINS; 
BLAKE WALKER; BRACKUS LUKE 
RAY; MARY L. DOYL, CLIFF & LISA 
STRADLING; JAMES & WENDI 
HARVEY; JULIE GRAY; SCOTT E. & 
BRITTANY WILSON; ANDREW W. & 
KRISTA W. YOUNG; JAMES & 
MARGARET PURCELL; NICHOLAS 
S. & RYAN J. BERNARD; DONALD R. 
& WENDY ROGERS; PLEASANT 
GOVE PROPERTY, LLC; ANDREW 
RAMMELL; ROBERTM. BERRY; 
LYLE F. PETERSEN; SCOTT 
GOODMAN and WILLIAM & 
CHELSEY TIPTON, individuals. 
Petitioners, 
PETERSON PLUMBING SUPPLY, a 
Utah Corporation. 
ORDER ON PETITION TO 
NULLIFY LIENS 
Civil No. 080402976 
Judge Samuel D. McVey 
Respondent. 
000139 
THIS MATTER comes before the Court pursuant to Petitioners' Petition to Nullify Liens. 
A hearing was held on this Petition on October 8, 2008 before the honorable Judge Samuel D. 
McVey. Petitioners were present represented by Counsel Paul D. Dodd and Respondent was 
present represented by Counsel Dana T. Farmer. The Court having reviewed all applicable 
pleadings and heard oral arguments on the case and for good cause appearing does hereby now 
ORDER, ADJUDGE, and DECREE as follows: 
1. Respondent filed its Notice of Lien's after 180 days from the date of final 
completion and therefore the Notice of Liens were untimely. 
2. Respondents inchoate lien rights expired before its Notice of Liens were recorded. 
At that point their lien rights were void and could not be resurrected by a filing of a 
Notice of Completion. 
3. Therefore, the Court finds that all the liens involved in this Petition on Building N, 
V, W, X, and Y are wrongful liens and are void ab initio. 
4. The properties are hereby released from the lien and a legal description of these 
properties is attached to this Order as Exhibit "A". 
5. Petitioner can record a certified copy of this Order with the County Recorders. 
6. The issue of attorney's fees, costs, damages or statutory penalties is reserved for 
another hearing. 
DATED this / J day of Odd 2008. 
^ • v * A * . t < r ' ; . 
BY THE COURT: ° ^ V *'•*£?>* 
JTOGE SAMUEIL D. M0VEY % n n p 1 P & 
Approved as to Form: 
Dana Farmer 
Counsel for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, first class US mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy 
ofthe foregoing on this® day of October, 2008 to the following: 
Dana T. Farmer 
Smith and Knowles, P.C. 
4723 Harrison Blve. #200 
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Paul Dodd 
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and void, and released from the property. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I will ask you to prepare the 
order in this case, Mr. Dodd. The liens -- notices of liens 
on the -- and therefore the underlying lien on buildings, or 
units -- whatever they are -- N, V, W, X and Y are declared 
wrongful liens, and wall be expunged -- released. 
1 think that Mr. Farmer is spot on when he says what 
the statute meant and what the legislature says it meant. 
Having been somewhat involved with looking at that statute and 
evaluating it while on the construction section of the bar, I 
think he is precisely right. But my opinion on that doesn't 
matter because the Court of Appeal has said something else. 
The Court of Appeal has said in deciding whether 
a person is entitled to a lien that -- they said this in 
Foothill — that in this case that I'm referring to paragraph 
20 of the Foothill case. "In this case, whether or not Judston 
was, quote, 'entitled to a lien,' unquote, is determined at the 
time Judston filed its disputed third notice of interest July 14, 
2006." 
Now in reading that under probably what the legislature 
intended and what Mr. Farmer would say, you would stop there and 
say, "Well, yeah, were they a licensed subcontractor at that 
time?" Then Foothill goes past that and says, "No, you look at 
whether their lien is timely." That's what Foothill says. So 
Foothill substantially expands the statuter and the Court has to 
nnnvw 
-45-
i follow that, 
2 In this case the inchoate lien rights expired before the 
3 notices of lien were recorded. They became void 180 days after 
4 the certificate of occupancy was issued, indicating substantial 
5 completion on these projects. Accordingly, at that point they 
6 were void and they disappeared and could not be resurrected by 
7 the subsequent recording or filing with the State of the notice 
8 of completion. 
9 Further, the notices of completion -- I think the sta --
10 the notice of completion statute is intended to allow someone 
11 to give notice to all of the suppliers and subcontractors and 
12 shorten the time from 180 days to 90 days to record a lien. So 
13 it's supposed to be issued within that 180-day period early on 
14 in order to shorten that. That's what the intent of that statute 
15 is, not to resurrect voided inchoate lien rights. 
16 So I -- you know, I was quite frankly surprised when I 
17 saw how the Court came out in Foothill, like Mr. Farmer was. I 
18 believe today that he's correct in this view of what the statute 
19 means and what the legislature said, but nonetheless, the Court 
20 has to abide by his ruling, and look at whether -- and rather 
21 than say entitled to a lien means a statutory definition, saying 
22 entitled to a lien means you look and see whether they had a 
23 lien right that they could still record on at the time that they 
24 recorded the notice of lien. It's kind of surprising to me, but 
25 that's what the Court of Appeal has said, and so I have to do 
DO0279 
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~u Her f^d on t t a« , the riotio Jt lien^ will be released 
ly -- either by order or the Court or by other means that Counsel 
aqree upon, and we'll take it from there, and then we'll -- once 
you've been able to conduct your discovery on these other issues, 
we'11 look at that. 
I don't know if you'd be anticipating filing a 
'riwsuit aqamst the general contractor or whomever you were an --
whomever Peterson Plumbing was contracting with, but you might 
want to look at -- if you do - - well, I don't know if it would 
be advisable to consolidate those things or not. It seems like 
there would be some similar facts, but maybe not. Maybe they're 
sufficiently different that the cases shouldn't be consolidated. 
So I'll you prepare that order, Mr. Dodd, serve that on 
Mr Farmer in due course, and then submit it. We'll — you know, 
we'll look at it if there are no -- we'll sign it if there are no 
objections, okay9 
MR. DODD. Thank ycu, your Honor. 
MR. FARMER: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT Thank you, Counsel 
(Hearing concluded) 
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